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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
CONSTANCE H. BARRETT,
P laintif!-Respondent,

vs.
ROBERT MICHAEL BARRETT,
Defendant-Appellant.

l

l

Case
No.
10268

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
AND

PETITION FOR AN AW ARD OF ATTORNEY'S
FEES IN CONNECTION WITH APPEAL
Appeal from the Judgment of the Third District Court
of Salt Lake County, Hon. A. H. Ellett, District Judge.
RE8PONDENT'S STATEMENT
OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
As stated by the appellant, this is an action for divorce wherein the plaintiff by her complaint seeks a
divorce, custody of the minor child of the parties, support money, alimony and a monetary award.
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DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The lower court granted the plaintiff the divorce,
awarded her custody of the minor child of the parties,
the sum of $200 each month as support money for the
minor child, the sum of $250 per month until her death or
remarriage as alimony, and judgment in the sum of
$15,000 as a division of property and $1,750 as attorney's
fees. From the decree in favor of the plaintiff the def endant has appealed.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The respondent seeks to have this court affirm the
judgment and decree of the trial court, and award her
an additional attorney's fee in the amount of $i9.t2..'.~
for legal services rendered by her attorney in connection
with this appeal.

IDENTIFICATION OF THE PARTIES
AND EXPLANATION OF ABBREVIATIONS
Constance H. Barrett is the plaintiff and respondent.
Robert Michael Barrett is the defendant and appellant.
For practical purposes Constance H. Barrett is sometimes ref erred to by her own name or as the plaintiff and
Robert Michael Barrett is sometimes referred to by his
own name or as the defendant. The foregoing is consistent with the appellant's identification of the parties.
"T-----·" refers to a page reference in the transcript
of the trial proceedings. "lL ____ ,, refers to a page reference in the record. of the case.
2

RESPONDENT'S STATEMENT OF FACTS
'l'he defendant's statement of facts up to the point of
the trial (p. 2 and 3 of appellant's brief) is substantially
correct. Thereafter, the appellant launches into matters
which are more appropriately a part of his argument.
Respondent will therefore make no other statement at
this point in her brief but will in the course of the argument point out other additional pertinent facts which
amply support the findings and decree of the trial court.
SCOPE OF REVIEW
"There are numerous decisions of this court
holding that the Supreme Court will not substitute its judgment in a divorce proceeding relative
to alimony and division of property for that of
the trial court unless the record clearly discloses
that the trial court's decree in such matters is
plainly arbitrary." Allen v. Allen, 109 Utah 99
(1946), 165 P.2d 872.
See also Anderson v. Anderson, 104 Utah 104, 138
P.2d 252, 254, Stewart v. Stewart 66 Utah 366, 242 P.
947; Adamson v. Adamson, 55 Utah 544, 188 P. 635;
Pinney v. Pinney, 66 Utah 612, 245 P. 329; Bullen v.
Bullen, 71 Utah 63, 262 P. 292; Blair v. Blair, 40 Utah
306, 121 P. 19, Ann. Cas. 1914D 989, 38 L.R.A., N.S. 269;
Friedli v. Friedli, 65 Utah 605, 238 P. 647; Pinion v.
Pinion, 92 Utah 255, 67 P.2d 265, 267.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT IN REFERENCE TO THE PLAINTIFF'S GROUNDS FOR DIVORCE
ARE AMPLY SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE AND PLAINTIFF WAS ENTITLED TO THE DECREE OF DIVORCE AS
GRANTED.

The findings of the trial court in reference to the
plaintiff's grounds for divorce are amply supported by
the evidence. The following excerpts from her testimony
clearly indicate the rPspondent's grounds for divorce:
('T. 7, 8)
"A I prefer not to give the sordid details.
However, I found shortly after my marriage that
I was no longer the object of Mr. Barrett's love
and affection. In fact, I was primarily a mistress
in marriage. He totally rejected me in most cases
and particularly after the - we found out we
were expecting our little girl.
"Q How soon after your marriage to Mr.
Barrett was it before you found out that you were
expecting the birth of a child~

"A I'm not entirely sure. I visited doctors
in Las Vegas, and they determined that I was
with child. I suppose the record would be there
if you would care to secure that record.
"Q lt was iuum·diately affrr your rnaniage.
Is that correct?
"A Yes. A very short time after we moved
to Las Vegas.
4

"Q Now, could you indicate just generally
what you observed about his attitude changing?
You alluded to that previously. Indicate to the
court what you observed in that respect, his attitude toward you.

"A Well, he just became inconsiderate, tyrannical, and dictatorial in his behavior.
"Q Were you subject to any physical abuse 7

"A Yes, on occasion"***
"Q Give the court some indication of what
threats you were exposed to.

"A The night before I left, Bob had been
drinking part of the day, and he had been disappointed in a legal problem; and although I understand that he had been drinking and was disappointed and had his share of problems in his position "Q And what happened 7

"A l\lacoy, I would like not to talk about it,
please.
"Q I'm not asking, Mrs. Barrett, that you go
into what you indicate sordid details.

"A I submitted you a piece of paper. May
I have your permission to read it in court1 ...
(T. 7, 8)
It is apparent that she was imposed upon and abused
in their intimate personal life (T. 9). In addition, (T.
9, 10)

" ... He threatened me that he was going to beat
my g. d. head off and in fact attempted to do so
on the day I left him.
5

"Q What did he do on that day?
"A He came at me like - told me he was
going to beat my g. d. head off and came toward
me. I '.Vent out through the door, and ht' slammed
the door and I screamPd. I didn't frel that I could
take a possible chance of the destruction of our
unborn baby regardless of anything.

"Q Now, you stated as l believe a little earlier
that you observed after your marriage and after
it was discovered that you were pregnant that he
was I think you used the words dictatorial, maybe
domineering. vVould you indicate briefly what
you were objecting to in that respect?
"A Just vulgar language and untrue accusations and suspicions."***

"Q Did he ever strike you 1
"A No. He attempted to. He did grab me by
the arm on one occasion and throw me into the
bed, but apart from that, he didn't ever strike me,
no, but I know he would have on that particular
day." (T. 9, 10)

It was only when counsel for the plaintiff in the
trial of the case unduly pressed for further sordid details
in regard to the prolilems in the marriage that the plaintiff understandably expn·ssed some rdnctance in responding (T. 10, 11) which caused some annoyance to the
court (T. 11). Plaintiff did make tlw statement that she
did not want a di Yon·(~ ( '!'. 11) and c:vPn sai<l that she
6

loved the defendant (T. 11) which prompted the court
to say, "\Vhy don't we go home." (T. 12) Plaintiff was
so distraught, upset and beside herself that the court
granted a short recess (T. 12) and thereafter in a discussion between plaintiff, her counsel and the court she
was able to convey to the court that in stating that she
dirl not want a divorce she was really stating that she
regretted that her marriage was ending as it was; that
this was not really what she "wanted" but that she certainly did want the court to grant the decree she was
seeking. ( T. 13-15) rrhat the plaintiff certainly did want
a decree of divorce was then clarified for the record
(T. 15-16) and the plaintiff then proceeded to state additional problems and difficulties that had occurred in
their marriage (T. 17-21).

It was only after listening to such an elaboration of
of sordid details and seeing the plaintiff so emotionally
upset and beside herself that the court in an obvious
effort to terminate an unnecessary elaboration of such
details, s1Jare her feelings and get on with other important matters in the trial of the case that the court stated
''It may be that counsel will stipulate that grounds for
divorce have now been shown." (T. 21) Pursuant to that
suggestion Mr. Beless who conducted the trial of the case
and had seen all that had unfolded had no hesitation in
stating, "Yes, I will so stipulate." (T. 21)
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In the lig·ht of the record and the emotion filled trial
of the case which could uot possi\Jly be reflected in full
measure on the record thPre is no question that the
plaintiff has shown ample grounds for the divorce she
is seeking. 'l'lte suggesti011 Uiat she has not sho\\'n sud1
grounds should only be interpreted as a prelude to the
defendant's argurnent that tlH' mn1rd of alimony to the
plaintiff should be diminished.

rrhe defendant's real

argument has always bce11 '"dollars'' and not ''grounds."

POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN ACCEPTING
THE STIPULATION OF COUNSEL THAT THE PLAINTIFF
HAD BY HER TESTIMONY SHOWN GROUNDS FOR DIVORCE.

The argument under Point I clearly demonstrates
the suggestion of the trial court that "lt may be
that counsel would stipulate that grounds for divorce
have now been shown," was most appropriate; was an
obvious effort to shorten the trial and not to prolong the
record when in the colut's mind grounds had already
been shown. Certainly the def end ant having stipulated
that grounds for divorce had then been shown is not now
on this appeal in any position to raise the <1uestion. If
nothing else he is estoppE3d.
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POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN AWARDING
THE PLAINTIFF ALIMONY IN THE SUM OF $25'0 PER
MONTH UNTIL HER DEA:TH OR REMARRIAGE.

1'he award of alimony to the plaintiff in the sum of
$250 per month until her death or remarriage was amply
justified by the evidence.
Matters to be considered in awarding alimony and
settling property rights are well established. Allen v.
Allen, 109 Utah 99, 165 P.2d 872; Anderson v. Anderson,
104 Utah 104, 138 P.2d 252; Pinion v. Pinion, 92 Utah 255,
67 P.2d 265.
At the time of the plaintiff's marriage to the defendant she owned a one-third interest in property in Salt
Lake City having an equity value of /approximately
$7,000 (T. 22). She had had previous employment whereby she earned $400 per month and $50 a month traveling
expense (T. 23). She had also worked as a secretary
earning $350 per month (T. 23). During the year prior
to her marriage to Mr. Barrett she had worked at the
Alpine Rose Lodge earning $±00 per month (T. 23).
It is true that she had children by a former marriage
and was receiving $50 per month for the support of each
of those children (T. 23).
On the other hand, the plaintiff's testimony that at
the time of the marriage of the parties the defendant
was a multi-millionaire was undisputed (T. 23). He was
the owner of the Solitude Ski Resort (T. 24). Since the
marriage of the parties, Michele, their daughter, was
9

born, and that terminated ht:·r ability to work and hPr
opportunity for employ111ent (T. :2·1-:23). On the other
hand, the defendant has lwt>n most successful and made
the undisputed statement to the plaintiff that "1\laking
a million dollars is tlw c•asiest thing in the world .... "
(T. 25)
At the time of the trial tht> only income the plaintiff
had was the temporary support allowance re<111ired to be
paid by the defendant and the support that came to her
for the benefit of her children by the prior marriage ( T.
25). As for the defendant, the plaintiff's statement that
he, the defendant, had put two and one-half million dollars into his ski lifts and that if he advertised in the New
York Times he believed that he could i_·asily sell it for
-1 million dollars is undisputed. (T. 27)
As for the plaintiff's living conditions at the time of
the trial the same were very inadcq uate ( T. 27). She
gave a room by room description of where she was
living (T. 27) all of which indicated juRtification of her
statement that her place was "Just inadequate in every
respect. Socially is a devastating situation." ('r. 28)
Her furnishings were likewise inadc•quak ( T. :28) and
much was borrowed ( 'l1. 2~).
\Vith respect to her current living 1wt•d:,; she stated
that what she n~ally needed was a home ('l'. ~ll). For
her i111111ediatt'. quartc·rs it \\·as stated tliat it would lH' nl'e-
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essary to rent an apartment for which she would be
re(1uired to pay $200 per month. She stated that the defendant ought to pay $150 of this amount (T. 30). As
for the home which she really needs the plaintiff stated
that with the present equity she has in her property she
could with an additional $17,000 obtain one (T. 31). Food
and household items require $150 per month (T. 31).
Medical needs amount to $25 per month (T. 32). With
respect to clothing, she needs $50 per month (T. 32). As
for transportation for her and Michele she needs $40 per
month (T. 32). This, of course, includes insurance (T.
32). $50 per month is necessary for her to pay for such
furniture as she needed. With respect to miscellaneous
items such as education and recreational activities, etc.
it is her best judgment that she will require from $50
to $100 per month (T. 32-33). If she were awarded a sufficient amount to obtain a home she would need for maintenance and utilities about $100 per month (T. 33).
The foregoing living requirements for the plaintiff
and Michele, all of which were undisputed, total $615.
'l'he plaintiff was seeking to have the court award
her the sum of $200 per month for the child of the parties
the same to be fortified by a trust arrangement similar
to that provided for the defendant's earlier child, Tina
(R. 68). She was seeking $500 per month as alimony
(R. 69) and further sought to have the court award her
the diamond ring in addition the sum of $17,500. (A
suffieit>nt sum to purchase a modest home.) (R. 69).
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The trust providing $200 iwr rnontl1 for Tina tlH•
child of his second marriag·e is still operating ( T. 52, 54).
File No. 105959 was marked and received as Exhibit D3.
The file was received only for the purpose of the trust
agreement (T. 54).

The trial court did not secure the payment of the
$200 per month support money by the establishment of
a trust as was requested but instead made an award of
support and alimony and cash in tlw amount of $15,000.
The court was no doubt conCl'rIH:'d with tlw indifferent
attitude that has been <•xhibifrd hy the deft>ndant ever
since the pregnancy of the plaintiff and suhst>qu<>nt birth
of Michele (T. 7, 8). The plaintiff did not even know
where the defendant was when the ehild was born ( T. -1-G).
He never even came to see the plaintiff immediatdy hefore of after the birth of the child and has never COlll<' to
see the plaintiff since she has been separah•d and has
never been to see Michele (T. ±(i). He has never sent
Michele anything other than money, which lw has bePn
required to pay by reason of the ordl'l' of the court ( '11 •
~7). He has never so much as even seen l\lichele ( T. 47),
nor has he made any inquiries to the plaintiff as to how
she is getting along (T. 47).

It is evident, therefore, that the record supports the
alimony award of $250 which was suhstantially less than
the plaintiff \Vas seeking. As a matter of fact, the urnlis-
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puted testimony would have supported a combined award
of at least $615 per month for alimony and support.
There was certainly nothing arbitrary in what the court
granted unless it was to grant a combined alimony and
support money award of only $450 when the undisputed
evidence was that she needed at least $615.

There is, of course, no dispute in regard to the $200
per month to be paid as support for the child Michele.

The trial court's concluding remarks aptly sum up
the situation. The trust agreement for the former child,
Tina, contemplated $200 per month which was the standard he had set for that child. The trial court thought
he ought to do as well for the child of this marriage (T.
71). The court was impressed that the plaintiff's status
had substantially changed, that whereas prior to the
marriage she was employed and able to earn a substantial
salary, now, she "is still a baby sitter. There is no way
for her to get out of that and she is entitled to something in that regard. I think she ought to be entitled to
$250 a month as alimony until she remarries or until her
death, and I think the man ought to have that ring.
I think that ring is all beyond the lady's means and
capacity, and if she goes around showing that, somebody
will be taking it away from her and leaving her with a tap
on the head to remind her that she owned a diamond
ring." (T. 72)
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POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN AWARDING TO
THE PLAINTIFF THE SUM OF $15,000 BY WAY OF A
DIVISION OF PROPERTY.

As for the cash award of $15,000 this is a pittance
insofar as the defendant is concerned. Exhibit "1", the
balance sheet of Barrl'tt Investment Company, gives
some indication of the net worth of the defendant. The
defendant of course, is the sole stockholder of Barrett
Investment Company (T. 56). Exhibit "l", the balance
sheet, shows among the liabilities of Barrett Investment
Company an amount of $1,444,178.28 payable to the defendant himself. Exhibit P-'5, the R. M. Barrett Agency
account gives some further indication of the defendant's
substantial wealth. Likewise, Exhibit P-4, defendant's
answers to plaintiff's interrogatories, gives further enlightenment as to the means and resources of the def endant.
Now the ring, which was acquired for the plaintiff,
(T. 33-34) was thought by the court for the reasons
noted above to be best awarded to the defendant. The
ring had a value of approximately $9,500 (R. 48).
The court's first imvression insofar as a cash award
was concerned was to give the plaintiff $10,000 (T. 72)
which would have essentially h<~Pn cash in liPu of the ring
which the trial court though would be much to hPr ad14

vantage. It was in the "further argument" noted on
page 73 of the transcript that it was pointed out to the
court that considering the wealth of the defendant as
evidenced by Exhibit 1 and P-5, that the defendant himself personally had a claim of $1,444,198.28 against Barrett Inverstment Company and that Barrett Investment
Company was still able to show a net worth in excess of
one million dollars; that is was therefore not inappropriate in view of the plaintiff's needs and circumstances that
the plaintiff should be awarded her ring and a greater
sum than $10,000. The trial court then agreed that the
plaintiff should be awarded $15,000 but still felt the
defendant should be awarded the ring.
Counsel for the defendant who was not present at
the trial has misconstrued the intent and purpose of the
court's words "I think I ought to give her $15,000. That
would pay her well." (T. 73) This statement was not
made with any vindictiveness nor with any thought of
penalizing the defendant but was simply the court's observation that the award that was being made was sufficient.
POINT V
THE PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO AN ADDITIONAL
AWARD AS A REASONABLE ATTORNEY'S FEE FOR
LEGAL SERVICES RENDERED IN CONNECTION WITH
THE APPEAL OF THE CASE IN THE AMOUNT OF $.ff/!...

The defendant is not contesting the award of $1,750
to thl' plaintiff as a reasonable attorney's fee. The stip15

ulation of the parties at the trial with respect to the font>
spent in handling the case and the reasonable charge for
time spent precludes any such argument on that point.
Now, of course, the plaintiff has lwen required to
have the assistance of counsel in representing her on the
appeal. The plaintiff is here\vith filing a petition in connection with the appeal supported by an affidavit indicating the appropriateness of the award she is seeking.
Based on her petition and supporting affidavit and the
stipulation of the parties at the trial of the case that $20
would be a reasonable charge ver hour ('1 G8), the plaintiff should be awarded by this court an additional attorney's fee in the amount of $__9.5?t? ___ .
1

•

SUMMARY
In summary, the plaintiff contends that the record
clearly reveals ample grounds for divorce; that the
award of $250 per month as alimony is justified by the
evidence. The defendant is not contesting the award of
$200 per month as support money for the child, Michele.
As for the award of $15,000 as has been pointed out the
plaintiff was not awarded her diamond ring worth approximately $9,500 but instead was given a cash award
in the amount indicated which in view of the relative circumstances of the parties \Vas modest to say the least.
The plaintiff is not able to pursue her employment but
is no-w a "hahy sitter." She is only seeking to assume
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her role as a mother and give the proper care and attention to a child of Mr. Barrett whose unwillingness to pay
the amount awarded by the trial court without direction
from this court is certainly not justified in view of his
wealth. It is difficult to imagine that he would, under
the circumstances, be willing for the plaintiff to have
the amount awarded by the trial court which would permit the plaintiff to acquire a much needed home for
her and Michele, and yet it must be conceded that this
attitude is quite consistent with the attitude he has
demonstrated in the past, an attitude of a total lack of
concern for the well-being of either the plaintiff or the
child of the parties (T. 46-47). The judgment and decree
of the trial court should be affirmed and the plaintiff
should be awarded the additional sum of $.. ff.~-- as a
reasonable fee for legal services rendered in connection
with the appeal of the case.

McKAY AND BURTON
and
MACOY A. McMURRAY

(:({rt:ff~UI!<~ _'J,_YE:'~ /

.

By
Macoy A. Mc~;-~~y

.

'

720 Newhouse Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Resporulent
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